Türkiye is the main key issue as Israel, Greece and Cyprus hold the summit

The tripartite partnership took shape about 15 years ago after Israel’s relations with Türkiye deteriorated, even if it was initially framed in the language of energy cooperation and regional diplomacy.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will host his Greek and Cypriot counterparts in Jerusalem on Monday as part of a three-way partnership that is steadily changing its character.

The partnership crystallized about 15 years ago after Israel’s relations with… turkey It has deteriorated, even if it was initially framed in the language of energy cooperation and regional diplomacy.

But what was once implicit has now become clearer, with concerns about Türkiye’s intentions increasingly defining the tripartite agenda.

A decade ago, natural gas served as the language and legitimacy for building closer relations with Greece and Cyprus, two countries that for decades were among the most critical of Israel in Europe. Gas pipelines, export routes, and connecting electrical grids were ways to deepen cooperation between the three countries without explicitly framing it as an alliance against Türkiye.

But today, as energy projects fade or change shape and regional tensions worsen, that caution has given way to more candor. Security cooperation – once a talking point that emerged long after the gas issue was discussed – has become the mainstay of the relationship.

On the eve of this summit, reports emerged – and were later denied – that the three countries were considering forming a rapid reaction force composed of military units from each country.

The roots of this partnership lie in the early years of this century, when Israel’s offshore gas discoveries coincided with a sharp deterioration in its relations with Ankara, which came after the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as prime minister in 2002.

Türkiye’s historic rivals have become new Israeli partners

While Erdogan brought about a radical change in Türkiye’s relationship with Israel, which was clearly demonstrated in the Mava Marama incident in 2010, Israel lost an important strategic ally. As a result, it has sought new partners in the region to replace Türkiye, and Greece and Cyprus – Turkey’s historical rivals and wary of its regional goals – have emerged as natural alternatives.

Energy cooperation was the initial framework – something that could have served as a basis for closer ties, bringing Israel closer to Europe, and deepening coordination with two EU member states without immediately defining the alliance as a counterweight to Turkey.

At the time, the gas story was compelling, with the ambitious idea of ​​creating a pipeline extending from Israel through Cyprus to Greece and then to Europe. the Eastern Mediterranean PipelineThe project, as it was known, was expensive and technically difficult, but it provided a vision around which this new alignment could come together.

This alignment was even more surprising because it contradicted history. Greece and Cyprus have been among the harshest and most consistent critics of Israel in Europe for decades. The sight of the leaders of Israel, Greece and Cyprus standing side by side at summits in Nicosia and Athens was a major diplomatic shift. The gas did not erase political differences, but it created common interests strong enough to transcend them.

But Türkiye has always lurked in the background. The proposed energy routes were attractive not only because they linked Israel to Europe, but also because they circled Türkiye. However, this is rarely stated explicitly. The focus remained positive: cooperation, development and regional stability. Energy allowed the three countries to strengthen the alliance as a counterweight to Turkey without presenting it as such.

This framing was deliberate. Israel is still testing whether its relationship with Ankara can get back on track. For their part, Greece and Cyprus preferred not to frame their diplomacy clearly as anti-Turkey. The puzzle provided a neutral vocabulary – a vocabulary that enabled progress without forcing confrontation.

But over time, the limitations of this approach became clear. The EastMed pipeline to Europe never took off, despite endless discussions. The project was quietly taken off the agenda due to its high costs, engineering challenges, changing energy markets and, ultimately, the withdrawal of US support in 2022.

But energy cooperation has not completely disappeared. Gas exports to Egypt – and from there to Europe – moved forward. Discussions about undersea electricity extensions linking Israel directly to Cyprus and then to Greece and the European electricity grid began to advance. But gas no longer carries the political or strategic weight it once did. She could not maintain the relationship on her own.

Instead, the relationship has been maintained through enhanced security cooperation, which has been evolving all the time.

Even before the collapse of the ambitious gas projects, Israel and Greece were building an impressive network of military relations. Israeli pilots trained in Greek airspace after the closure of Turkish airspace. Joint exercises have expanded in scope and pace. Intelligence cooperation deepened.

Cyprus has also steadily strengthened its security dialogue and cooperation with Jerusalem, and even allowed IDF soldiers to train there.

By the early 2020s, this cooperation had matured into an institutional arrangement. Long-term defense agreements were signed. Big buy trades moved forward. Coordination between air, naval and ground forces became routine rather than exceptional. The relationship deepened.

What has changed in recent years is not the existence of that cooperation, but the context in which it is now discussed.

Türkiye’s actions have sharpened threat perceptions across the region. Violations of airspace over the Aegean Sea, naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean, diplomatic and military activity in Libya, and efforts to consolidate influence in Syria have made it clear to Athens, Nicosia, and Jerusalem that Turkey is flexing its muscles and testing its limits.

For Greece, the concern is less about large-scale war and more about escalation through miscalculation. For Cyprus, this represents the continuity of a divided island supported by an overwhelming Turkish military presence. For Israel, Turkish deployments or influence could one day complicate freedom of operations over the skies of Lebanon and Syria.

These are not identical concerns. But they overlap.

This overlap explains why ideas that were once politically sensitive are being publicly aired – and rejected. Reports in recent weeks about deliberations on a tripartite rapid reaction framework involving Israeli, Greek and Cypriot forces have sparked a swift official reaction, confirming that a permanent joint force has not been established. These denials are important. They reflect real constraints and a clear desire to avoid formal alliance commitments.

But it also reflects something else: the desire to announce that the three countries are thinking together about crisis response and how they can work together in crises. A decade ago, such discussions would have remained completely behind closed doors. Today, even their denial sends a message.

There is a paradox here. Gas has long been portrayed as the foundation of the partnership between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. But Türkiye was the reason the partnership was formed in the first place, even if that is not how it was organized at the time.

As ambitious energy projects fade or change shape, what remains is the core of the relationship: security cooperation, defense procurement, intelligence sharing, and close diplomatic coordination. This core has proven to be more sustainable than any infrastructure plan.

Türkiye, once the static backdrop, has become the catalyst for why all this matters; The central factor – in today’s fluid regional order – is what drives the alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus in the first place.