While the H5N1 bird influenza virus sins its way all over the world – killing Wild animalsand Commercial livestock and Even some people Scientists and health officials fear that we are on the edge of another global pandemic.
But when it is difficult to predict, where and how it can pass-partly, some researchers say, because of the handrails that the federal government has developed about job gain research.
The term describes the experiences that seek to understand the virus capabilities to adapt to the new hosts, spread more easily, survive for a longer period in the environment and cause the injured to become more ill. Although many scientists look at the approach as an important tool for biological research, other experts have long complained that it was an unacceptable risk-a reputation that has been exacerbated by constant speculation that the virus responsible for the Covid-19 was created in job gain experiences in a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
This has prompted many virus scientists to move away from work to avoid stigma and regulatory red strip. In this regard, some say that officials deprived of valuable information that could help them expect and prepare moves from H5N1.
“Do I think that if this research is accepted on a larger scale, then we will have a better grip on this virus and what might do it after that? Or to what extent can it change? Or what will that take it?” to request Richard WebbiDirector of the Cooperation Center of the World Health Organization for Environment Studies in influenza in animals and birds. “Yes.”
Felicia GodrumAircuts at the University of Arizona said that job gains can enable health officials to identify the disturbing H5N1 mutations and define anti -viral and vaccine targets.
“Without it, we just fly in the dark,” she said.
Critics of this line of research do not see this in this way. They say that the work is very dangerous, which makes it possible to escape the causes of the environment disease as people do not have a natural immunity. Worse, as they argue, it can end in the hands of the vulnerable actors who can use them as a vital weapon.
These risks exceed the promise of work that may not be useful as their supporters suggest. Mark LibchProfessor of Epidemiology at Harvard Chan College of Public Health.
Leipch argues that what scientists and health officials need to know to contain the outbreak of fascism, are things like infected animals, which people offer, and their number who fell into the virus and their disease as a result.
“This is the basic epidemics and veterinary questions,” said Lebitch. “I can’t think of any way I can inform job earning studies-much less-these questions.”
One of the supporters of the animals brings a blood sample from the hurry of dairy -coated dairy against the bird flu in Amis, Iowa, in July.
(Agricultural Research Service at the US Department of Agriculture via Associated Press)
The controversy dates back to 2011, when two independent research groups said they conducted experiments to earn a job that led to the H5N1 strains that can spread through the air between rodents, a type used for the modeling of influenza behavior in humans.
H5N1 was first identified in the wild geese in China in 1996 and soon spread among birds in Asia, where people jumped on hundreds of occasions along the way. More than half of these known infections were fatal.
The high death rate and the geographical spread of the virus, George W. Bush at the time, pushed a program worth $ 7.1 billion to prepare for its inevitable arrival in the American beaches. Create Universal Monitoring and Preparation Network Cross patriotic. He also directed federal funds to vaccine stocks and antiviral drugs, as well as millions of dollars towards laboratory research.
Amid this flood of support, Yoshiro KawakaA team at the University of Wisconsin in Madison and Ron FutureI started at the University of Arasmus in the Netherlands simultaneously in the H5N1 experience, where genetic mutations were inserted into the RNA to find out the changes that it could transform from a virus that easily transmitted between birds to one has passed efficiently among people.
Couka and its colleagues Jin Hmagglutinin collected from the bird influenza virus with genes of the H1N1 swine flu virus. Then they persuaded their hybrid to develop in a way that allowed them to link mammal cells instead of bird cells. They found Four mutations in the H5 gene were sufficient to create a virus capable of spreading between rodents in neighboring cages.
Meanwhile, researchers at Fouchier’s Laboratory Examination only with H5N1. They added a handful of the mutations that helped fuel the previous influenza pennies, and then they had their spots. The virus did not spread on its own initially, so scientists helped him by transferring him from the noses of infected animals to healthy boats. After 10 likes, The evolution of the virus To the point where it spreads on its own from the mongoose to another.
Studies have provided valuable confirmation that bird flu virus has the ability to raise a human pandemic, Dr. Arturo CasadevalImmunity physician and physician at the University of Johns Hopkins.
He said: “Before conducting these experiments, we did not know if H5N1 had biological ability to become breasts.”
But they also emphasized the risk that scientists can accelerate the threat. “This was the original poster for the job.”
Anxiety that information in studies can be used for bad use prompted to Kwoka and Fouchier to voluntarily Stop In 2012, their papers were published only after a comprehensive passing Safety review by The Consultative Council for the American National Sciences for Biotechnology. Job earning research resumed the following year.
Fears were revived in 2014 after federal laboratories worsened samples of smallpox, garden and H5N1. No one has gone, but it prompted a three -year freeze on federal funding for job gaining experiences that involve dangerous pathogens in particular, even even Tremical supervisory rules She was placed in place.
Such experiences are now through several layers of review at the possible researcher. If the work is funded by the National Health Institutes, follow additional reviews.
“There are many organizational obstacles to ensure a suitable risk reduction,” he said, “He said,” Semad LawVirus scientist at Emory University who study influenza viruses. “We are all very careful because no one wants to be accused of doing something safe.”
Biohazard allowances are suspended in the 4th Biomedical Safety Laboratory at the American Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at FT. Detrick, Maryland.
(Patrick Semansky / Associated Press)
She said that these obstacles can delay a research project for several months or more, if approved at all. Understanding was a deterrent, especially for scientists in the early stages of their career.
“It is definitely uncomfortable to conduct gain research,” said Guodrum. “We encourage people to enter this field.”
For some, the timing cannot be worse.
At least 65 people in the United States have H5N1 Since its arrival in North America in 2021, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Most cases included workers on dairy and poultry farms, and their symptoms – including conjunctivitis and the agitation of the upper respiratory tract – tend to be mild. But in two cases, people became very sick, including a A person in Louisiana And a teenager in Canada.
The Disease Control Center said that there is no evidence that the virus can spread directly from person to person. Scientists expect this to change sooner or later. As the influenza season picks up steam, the danger rises.
“The most fearful thing today is the re -installation event between the things that revolve in cows and seasonal influenza,” said Casadelfal. If both viruses have the same mammals at the same time, their ingredients can be mixed and corresponding to them in a way that creates “a strain capable of infecting humans extremely easily, which we do not have in immunity.”
“This is the experience of winning the job that is in nature,” he added.
It is a point that also suggested Webby, noting that job gain experiences are safer in a sealed condition Biological Safety Laboratory 3 Equipped with special ventilation systems and other reserves “from the farm”.
But Lipsitch and others say the fact that the virus is constantly turning and changing calls to questioning the importance of job winning research. The viral breed that can be prepared in the laboratory does not match what appears in the environment.
“There is a large element of randomness in evolution,” said Lebitch. “The fact that the experience is going one way in the laboratory does not mean that it will go in the same way elsewhere.”
Three molecules of the H5N1 influenza virus are seen as a rod in a pair of electronic microscopic images for colorful.
(CDC and Niaid)
Even if it is a close match, Lipsitch said, “There is convincing evidence that what you learn in one breed can be the opposite of a very closely related strain. So the generalization is very low.”
he Paper This took the mutations that made H5N1 “more suitable for mammals” in the experiences of Kawaka and Fouchier and applied it to a slightly different version of the virus. In this case, the researchers found a “completely different effect”.
She said that these shortcomings make research risks more difficult to justify Nicholas EvansBiological ethics specialist at the University of Massachusetts Lowell.
He said, “I think what the discussion in achieving the job is not responded to is,” What is the social value of these studies? “
For Evans, it seems very little, especially given the lack of urgency in the government’s response.
“The saying that this special part of the very specialized biological research in the H5N1 would have made a financial difference in a largely outbreak, as this was a large nonsense for me,”
Kawaka refused to discuss his research, and it was not possible to reach Fouchier.
Michael EmpireA virus specialist at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbour said that the experiments conducted by Kawaka and Fouchier are very useful as plans for what should be paid attention to as the virus is sweeping all over the world. More people were surprised by not talking about their value.
“It does not seem to indicate the fact that these experiences gained from jobs … gave us an important part of the information, which is that the virus can jump.”
Other gain experiences conducted on H5N1 years ago have led to the nomination of scientists about potential mutations that can help the real world virus spread more easily through the air, and improve the injury of cells in the breast respiratory system, and It becomes resistant to antiviral drugs.
“These experiences were 10 years ago,” Lakdawal said. “This helped us better.”
But unless the scientific community is work and challenges its negative image, this will not be the case in the future. “It is very likely that we will be less ready for the next epidemic than we were in the last one.”